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Abstract 
This paper considers whether publicly-financed new facility investments encourage professional sports 
team owners to increase their investments in costly talent. We develop a model of a sports league that 
incorporates publicly-financed facility investments, the unique characteristics of the talent market, and 
revenue sharing to explore the complementarity between new facility amenities, the team budget decision 
and team performance. Our empirical results suggest that publicly-financed new stadiums do little to 
improve team performance, not due to restrictions in the talent market, but rather due to a lack of fan 
response. (JEL: Z21, L88) 
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Introduction 
Many professional sports teams in North America have been the recipients of new playing 
venues in the last 25 years. A total of 21 Major League Baseball (MLB) have moved into new or 
extensively renovated facilities since 1990; 23 teams in the National Hockey League (NHL), 21 
teams in the National Basketball Association (NBA) and 12 teams in the National Football 
League (NFL) have done the same.1 These venues were constructed at significant costs, 
averaging $533.5 million in MLB in 2011 dollars2, $594.4 million in the NFL, $379.5 million in 
the NBA and $358.3 million in the NHL. The majority of these new venues required significant 
public financing by city and state governments – typically a bond issue that is retired by 
imposing sales and entertainment taxes. A large literature has developed that assesses the net 
benefit of new sports venues by estimating increases in employment and income that would not 
have occurred without the new construction. A sampling of these studies all agree that there are 
no net benefits, with good surveys in Noll and Zimbalist (1997), Owen (2003), Coates (2007) 
and Coates and Humphreys (2008). More recent studies reach the same conclusion, including 
Harger, Humphreys and Ross (2016) and Huang and Humphreys (2014). Humphreys and Zhou 
(2015) develop a spatial model of urban service consumption and production that suggests that a 
new sports facility could increase consumption benefits and local property values if the new 
facility is not too close to an already existing “consumption center” (the so-called agglomeration 
effect). This could provide a partial justification for a government subsidy for construction. 
However the concept is not subject to empirical measurement. 
Even if the economic benefits strictly calculated are trivial, since we have observed a great deal 
of new stadium construction, it is reasonable to speculate that a new sports venue may improve 
team performance and generate psychic benefits that are difficult to measure and are generally 
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excluded from net benefit calculations. These local psychic benefits include the satisfaction of 
hosting a successful team on the field, even if one never attends a game.3 The empirical evidence 
of psychic benefits is mixed and inconclusive and since the studies are highly specific to each 
stadium project and use different methodologies, the results provide few generalizations. A good 
survey is Walker and Mondello (2007). It may be the case that the psychic benefits are large and 
outweigh any economic loss. If so, one has a justification to provide public financing for a new 
sports venue, although there may be other concerns.4 Coffin (1996) found that a new stadium 
significantly increased attendance for several seasons due to its “novelty effect”. Clapp and 
Hakes (2005) used a more extensive dataset covering the 1950 – 2002 seasons in MLB and 
found a significant novelty effect for only two seasons following new stadium construction for 
multipurpose stadiums built up to 1974. The novelty effect increased to six to ten seasons for 
more recent stadiums. Coates and Humphreys (2005) found a significant novelty effect for eight 
seasons in baseball and nine seasons in basketball over the 1969 – 2001 seasons, but no novelty 
effect in football. The evidence is mixed across sports and venues, but is suggestive that there are 
some psychic benefits to new construction and the post construction behavior of the team. 
 
If there are psychic benefits over and above the purported but small economic benefits, then the 
team’s performance should be a driving force in generating these less traditional benefits. 
Increases in team payrolls should give a clue, however casual observations of changes in team 
payrolls after moving into a new facility do not show much consistency and offer no clear 
answers. Team payrolls increased by an average of 16.7% for MLB teams in their first season in 
the new venue, but did not increase at all in the second season, and in many cases, fell back to 
their pre-venue values in the third season. Table 1 summarizes the response of team payrolls for 
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MLB, NBA, NFL and NHL. The empirical puzzle is compounded by the lack of formal models 
characterizing team owner’s optimizing decisions after moving to a new venue. 
 
In this paper, we build a model of a professional sports team’s owner decides whether moving to 
a new facility will improve the team’s performance on the field. This leads to two questions: The 
first is whether a facility investment can increase the profitability of hiring more expensive 
talent; and the second is whether the owner is able do so. Whether profitability increases can be 
answered by determining the marginal revenue product schedule and whether it increases with a 
new facility. Whether the owner is able to acquire additional talent is more subtle. It requires (i) 
introducing a talent supply schedule into the model and (ii) recognizing that owners have other 
investment opportunities even if increases in revenue occur. 
 
Our model answers the two questions by incorporating a number of innovations into the standard 
profit-maximizing model of a professional sports team. First, we assume that the team owner 
maximizes profit by selecting a talent budget rather than an unobservable stock of team talent. 
As we will show, this is an important feature as it “monetizes” the talent decision and allows for 
the tightness of the talent market to enter the model. Second, we assume that fans consume 
amenities that are “produced” by the facility. The decision to invest in a new facility, or 
significantly renovate an existing facility, affects the consumption of these amenities in a simple 
way. However other inputs also enter the production of facility amenities that are specific to each 
market.  This new approach permits us to estimate the marginal effect of a new stadium on the 
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winning percentage of the local team.  Importantly it also allows us to estimate the elasticity of 
the supply of league talent even in the absence of a concrete measure of talent itself.  
 
Background 
Professional sports teams can be thought of as hiring a number of inputs that generate gate 
revenue. We will restrict our choices of inputs to just two: performance on the field and facility 
amenities. Amenities might include good sight lines to the field, comfortable seats, high-quality 
food and drink, large replay and information screens, clean restrooms and all the other features 
that make attending a game an enjoyable experience beyond the quality of the talent on the team. 
Each input is a measure of quality that shifts the demand curve for tickets and increases the 
maximum ticket price that consumers are willing to pay. If team quality and facility amenities 
are complimentary inputs, an increase in one input will increase the marginal revenue product 
(MRP) of the other. A new state of the art facility would then increase the MRP of team talent 
and perhaps encourage an owner to acquire more talent. Complementarity of these inputs is an 
important policy issue. If spectators and the city’s consumers (taxpayers) as a whole receive 
large psychic benefits from a successful team that wins championships, one could conceivably 
argue that a public investment in a new or renovated facility is in the public interest 
 
A small literature exists that has addressed the question of complementarity between team 
performance and a new facility investment. Quinn et al. (2003) developed a theoretical model of 
a professional sports team that invests in talent and a new facility. Facility investment serves to 
increase the MRP of team talent and the authors derive a set of necessary conditions for 
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complementarity to hold. The model was tested by employing two time-series regression models 
that explained how winning percentages changed after the move to a new facility. The sample 
period included the 1982-96 MBL, NBA, NFL and NHL seasons. The empirical results 
suggested that MLB clubs displayed a significant improvement in their winning percentages with 
the opening of a new facility, but this was not the case in the NBA, NFL or NHL.  Clapp and 
Hakes (2005) found that a new facility investment had no significant effect on attendance for 
MLB clubs for the sample period 1950-2002. This was determined by estimating a log-linear 
attendance function with team performance, facility investment and an interaction term between 
team performance and facility investment, as well as other demographic and economic variables.  
 
Our purpose in this paper is to develop a model of complementarity between team talent and 
facility investment that employs a different approach from Quinn et al. (2003) and Clapp and 
Hakes (2005). Specifically we consider the extent of the shift in the marginal revenue product of 
the team budget (that is spent on talent) as the measure of complementarity, not the equilibrium 
performance of the team which is the outcome of the interaction between talent demand, talent 
supply and the owner’s desire to pursue other investments. Whether winning percentage (Quinn 
et al. (2003)) or attendance (Clapp and Hakes (2005)) is employed as the measure of 
complementarity, both are the result of an equilibrium outcome in the sports league model rather 
than suggesting simply a shift in the value of the marginal product of talent. Our approach 
highlights this distinction both theoretically and empirically. If talent supply is infinitely elastic, 
winning percentage or attendance could be appropriate measures to indicate indirectly a shift in 
the MRP of the team budget with a new facility investment. However, if talent supply is 
constrained in any of a number of ways, team performance may show little improvement from a 
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new facility investment even though complementarity exists. Our approach explicitly 
incorporates the elasticity of the supply of talent and the market rate of return to alternative 
investments. A team owner, who receives greater revenues after moving into a new facility, may 
choose to invest the revenue elsewhere if the rate of return is favorable.  
 
A Model of the Club Owner’s Decision 
Amenities, Budgets and the Market for Talent 
Consider a team (indexed by i) that produces two outputs, team performance measured by 
winning percentage wi (0 ≤ wi ≤ 1) and facility amenities measured by 𝐴𝑖 ≥ 0. The team winning 
percentage is a non-linear function of the team stock of talent 𝑡𝑖 given by 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖(𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑘) where 
𝑡𝑘 is the talent stock of any one of the other n-1 teams in the league. This function has the 
properties 𝜕𝑤𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄ ≥ 0 and 𝜕
2𝑤𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑖
2⁄ ≤ 0. An increase in the winning percentage of team i is 
assumed to reduce the winning percentages of all the other teams equally, so 𝜕𝑤𝑘 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄ ≤ 0. With 
n teams in the league, we also impose an adding-up constraint that is ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝑛 2⁄  that 
formally links the winning percentage of each team to all of the other teams winning 
percentages.5 
 
Facility amenities include any facility-specific outputs that increase the utility of a fan in 
attendance. These could include outputs that are more or less fixed, such as comfortable seats, 
good sight lines, large video screens, convenient parking and so forth, as well as outputs that are 
variable, such as food and drink service, clean restrooms, helpful ushers, agreeable music etc.. 
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These amenities are produced according to the production function 𝐴𝑖 = 𝜋𝐿𝑖𝐾𝑖(𝐼𝑖). Periodic 
investments (𝐼𝑖) may be necessary to maintain the stock of facility capital (𝐾𝑖) that could include 
minor and major renovations or a new facility altogether. The current stock of facility capital is 
given by 𝐾𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1. The variable inputs that produce facility amenities are 
captured by 𝐿𝑖 since we assume that these are proportional to the stock of labour that is used in 
the facility. We assume that the wage rate per unit of talent in each local market is exogenous 
and given by 𝑊𝑖. The quality of the facility is measured by 𝜋, a sort of productivity measure that 
shifts the production function of amenities. Old and new facilities might use the same stock of 
capital, measured at market prices, but new facilities might be better suited to producing the 
amenities valued by consumers (HD video screens, luxury suites and so on). For now we assume 
that 𝜋 is identical for every facility. 
 
The club owner is assumed to provide a budget of money Bi to purchase the highest amount of 
talent possible6. The best response of the owner of team k to an increase in the owner of team i’s 
budget spending could be interpreted as a strategic rivalry response. If other owners respond, the 
total league budget B will change by an amount than differs from the increase in the budget 
spending of team i alone. This is formally captured by the derivative 𝜕𝐵 𝜕𝐵𝑖⁄ = 1 +
∑ 𝜕𝐵𝑘 𝜕𝐵𝑖⁄
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖 . We eliminate rivalries by imposing the Cournot-Nash conjecture 𝜕𝐵𝑘 𝜕𝐵𝑖⁄ = 0 
for any combination of team’s i and k.7 
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We assume that each owner is equally adept at evaluating talent but that each is limited in 
acquiring talent by its scarcity. The budget for team i is transformed into its stock of talent 
according to the function below. 
 
𝑡𝑖 =
𝐵𝑖
(∑ 𝐵𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
𝜔 =
𝐵𝑖
𝐵𝜔
          (1) 
 
The league supply of talent is ‘closed’ when  = 1. This is shown by aggregating to find the total 
league stock of talent. 𝑇 = ∑ 𝑡𝑖 =
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝐵𝑖 𝐵
𝜔⁄𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝐵 𝐵
𝜔⁄ = 𝐵1−𝜔. The average wage per unit of talent, 
Z, is related to both the league budget and the structure of the industry through ω: 𝑍 = 𝐵 𝑇⁄ = 𝐵 𝐵1−𝜔⁄ =
𝐵𝜔. Substituting 𝐵 = 𝑍𝑇 into 𝑇 = 𝐵1−𝜔 and taking logs, allows us to define the elasticity of talent supply 
as  
 
𝜀𝑍
𝑇 =
𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑇
𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑍
=
1−𝜔
𝜔
          (2) 
 
In the closed talent case, each team can only bid away talent from another team by increasing its 
budget as a share of the total league budget. In this case in which T is the total stock of league 
talent, 𝜕𝑇 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄  = 0 as T = 1, a constant and 𝜀𝑍
𝑇 = 0. In contrast, if the league supply of talent is 
‘open’ (competitive), then  = 0, T = B and 𝜀𝑍
𝑇 = ∞. In this case, the league stock of talent can 
increase as much as team budgets will allow since talent is available in infinitely elastic supply 
and 𝜕𝑇 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄  = 1.
8 
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An individual owner’s ability to acquire talent, 𝜕𝑡𝑖 for a given budget increase, 𝜕𝐵𝑖 , is greater in 
the case of a open talent market than an closed one. It is not difficult to show that 𝜕𝑡𝑖 𝜕𝐵𝑖⁄ =
(1 − 𝜔𝜎𝑖) 𝐵
𝜔⁄  where σi is the share of team i’s budget in the league budget: 𝜎𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖 𝐵⁄ . A team 
owner can purchase more talent from an increase in the budget with an open talent market since 
𝜕𝑡𝑖 𝜕𝐵𝑖⁄ = 1 but is 𝜕𝑡𝑖 𝜕𝐵𝑖⁄ = (1 − 𝜎𝑖) 𝐵⁄ < 1 in the closed talent market since we assume that 
B is scaled to a number at least as large as unity. 
 
The responsiveness of the league stock of talent to an increase in team i’s budget is measured by 
the elasticity 𝜀𝐵𝑖
𝑇 and is a function of  and the share of team i’s budget in the total league budget 
(𝜎𝑖).  
 
𝜀𝐵𝑖
𝑇 =
𝐵𝑖
𝑇
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝐵𝑖
=
𝐵𝑖
𝑇
(1 − 𝜔)𝐵−𝜔
𝜕𝐵
𝜕𝐵𝑖
=
𝐵𝑖
𝐵1−𝜔
(1 − 𝜔)𝐵−𝜔 = (1 − 𝜔)𝜎𝑖   (3) 
 
In the closed talent case ( = 1), 𝜀𝐵𝑖
𝑇 = 0 while in the open market case ( = 0), 𝜀𝐵𝑖
𝑇 = 𝜎𝑖 and is 
higher for teams that compose a larger share of the total league budget. We discuss intermediate 
values of ω below. 
 
The market wage rate per unit of talent is given by Z and is identical for each unit of talent 
acquired. A player’s salary is then just his own inherent stock of talent multiplied by Z. The 
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average market wage rate is determined by Z = B/T. In the open talent market, we have shown 
that T = B so Z = 1 and is constant regardless of the size of the league stock of talent. In the 
closed talent market, we have shown that T = 1 so Z = B. Any increase in the league budget 
simply drives up the market wage in the aggregate. The resulting increase in talent from a one 
dollar increase in the budget is smaller for team i in a closed market than in the open market in 
which the market wage is left unaffected by the efforts of team i to acquire talent. What will be 
the resulting increase in the market wage in the general case? We can find the elasticity of the 
market wage with respect to the budget of team i by utilizing the conditions that Z = B/T and 
𝑇 = 𝐵1−𝜔. 
 
𝜀𝐵𝑖
𝑍 =
𝜕𝑍
𝜕𝐵𝑖
𝐵𝑖
𝑍
=
𝑇−𝐵(1−𝜔)𝐵−𝜔
𝑇2
𝐵𝑖
𝑍
=
𝑇−(1−𝜔)𝐵1−𝜔
𝑇2
𝐵𝑖
𝑍
=
𝜔𝐵1−𝜔
𝐵2(1−𝜔)
𝐵𝑖
𝑍
=
𝜔𝜎𝑖
𝐵−𝜔𝑍
= 𝜔𝜎𝑖   (4) 
 
The elasticities in (3) and (4) give us a good picture of the talent market in our model. In the 
closed talent market, any attempt to acquire talent by increasing the team budget has no effect on 
the total stock of talent and the higher market wage rate increases the share of the team budget in 
the total league budget. Large market teams drive up the wage rate by more than small market 
teams in a closed talent market. In the open talent market, the stock of talent of the team 
increases by the budget share and the market wage rate does not increase at all. The novelty of 
(3) and (4) is that talent markets that fall between these two extremes are possible and even 
probable. The model allows for intermediate talent market constraints.9  
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Profit-Maximization with a Budget 
The local revenue for team i includes gate revenue from ticket sales, concession and parking 
revenue, local media revenue (radio and TV) and other sources of revenue. We choose to focus 
exclusively on gate revenue so that we can specify an inverse demand function that determines a 
unique ticket price. Including all sources of local revenue makes it difficult to specify a demand 
function for a unique product. Local revenue, 𝑅𝑖, is the product of the average ticket price and 
the quantity of tickets sold for the regular season and is given by 
 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖𝑄𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖(𝛿𝑤𝑖
𝛾𝐴𝑖
𝜃𝑃𝑖
−𝜌
) = 𝛿𝑤𝑖
𝛾𝐴𝑖
𝜃𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
      (5) 
 
The team winning percentage wi and arena amenities Ai serve to shift the demand function for 
tickets according to their elasticities  and . For simplicity, we assume for now that all teams 
share the same values of  and . The price elasticity of demand is given by  while the term  
captures demographic characteristics. We model demographic characteristics in this way for 
simplicity rather than include a variety of demographic variables in (5). We also assume that all 
ticket costs are fixed and known at the start of a season and are equal to Fi. In the long run, 
investment affects the number of tickets too, as per the size of the stadium. 
 
To motivate the public policy discussion, we assume that the team owner receives an amount of 
facility investment exogenously from a government. The amount of facility investment is not a 
choice variable for the team owner, although the owner may expend resources in lobbying for it. 
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We do not explicitly model the lobbying decision. Bodvarsson and Humphreys (2013) point out 
that facility investments are almost always financed by some level of government with little team 
participation. They then go on to model the level of facility investment by government as a 
positive function of team performance (winning percentage) on the argument that local 
governments are more willing to finance new constructions for winning teams. This is an 
intriguing and novel idea in a sports model, however we can cite many counterexamples of teams 
that have performed poorly for many seasons and still were rewarded with new facilities.10  
 
We adopt the pooled revenue sharing system used in the NFL and MLB where each club 
contributes a share 1- of their local revenue to a central league pool that is split evenly among 
all clubs at the end of the season.11 Under the pooled revenue sharing system, revenue after 
revenue sharing, 𝑅𝑖
𝐴 for team i is given by 
 
𝑅𝑖
𝐴 = 𝛼𝑅𝑖 +
(1−𝛼)(∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
𝑛
=
((𝑛−1)𝛼+1)
𝑛
𝑅𝑖 +
(1−𝛼) ∑ 𝑅𝑘
𝑛
𝑘≠𝑖
𝑛
     (6) 
 
where the first term reflects the revenue share received by the team directly, and the second, the 
return from the central pool. 
 
The owner maximizes team profit by choosing the team budget Bi and stadium labour input 𝐿𝑖 
subject to equations (1) and (5). The amounts spent on team talent and facility labour are 
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assumed to be independent. While not borrowing the funds needed for the team budget, the 
owner faces the opportunity cost of using the budget to purchase talent rather than some other 
investment that pays a market rate of return equal to r.  
 
𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖 − 𝐵𝑖 =
((𝑛−1)𝛼+1)
𝑛
𝑅𝑖 +
(1−𝛼) ∑ 𝑅𝑘
𝑛
𝑘≠𝑖
𝑛
− 𝑊𝑖𝐿𝑖 − (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑖 − 𝐹𝑖  (7) 
 
The Case of No Revenue Sharing 
Revenue sharing is an important feature of our model as it will impact the owner’s talent 
decision when facility investment is increased. For now we proceed without revenue sharing to 
more easily characterize and highlight some of the fundamental results generated by our model. . 
Setting 𝛼 = 1 and maximizing (6) with respect to 𝐿𝑖 gives the first-order condition below. 
 
𝜕𝑅𝑖
𝜕𝐿𝑖
= 𝛿𝑤𝑖
𝛾𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
𝜃(𝜋𝐿𝑖𝐾𝑖)
𝜃−1𝜋𝐾𝑖 − 𝑊𝑖 = 0       (8) 
 
To insure a diminishing marginal revenue product of labour, we impose 𝜃 < 1. The solution for 
𝐿𝑖 can be found easily. 
 
𝐿𝑖
∗ = (𝜋𝐾𝑖)
−1 (
𝑊
𝛿𝜃𝑤𝑖
𝛾
𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
𝜋𝐾𝑖
)
1
𝜃−1
= (𝜋𝐾𝑖)
−1 (
𝛿𝜃𝑤𝑖
𝛾
𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
𝜋𝐾𝑖
𝑊
)
1−𝜃
    (9) 
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All of the variables that contribute positively to the value of the marginal product of labour 
increase the optimal amount of labour to hire (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖 , 𝜋, 𝐾𝑖). The local wage rate reduces the 
optimal amount to hire. Substituting (9) into the function for facility amenities results in the 
optimized amenity function. 
 
𝐴𝑖
∗ = (
𝛿𝜃𝑤𝑖
𝛾
𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
𝜋𝐾𝑖
𝑊
)
1−𝜃
         (10) 
 
The team owner also maximizes (7) with respect to the team budget, giving the first-order 
condition below. 
 
𝜕𝑅𝑖
𝜕𝐵𝑖
= 𝛿𝜃𝛾𝑤𝑖
𝛾−1 (
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝐵𝑖
) 𝐴𝑖
𝜃𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
− (1 + 𝑟) = 0  
      = 𝛿𝜃𝛾𝑤𝑖
𝛾−1 (
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
1−𝜔𝜎𝑖
𝑍
) 𝐴𝑖
∗𝜃𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
− (1 + 𝑟) = 0      (11) 
 
The first term in (11) is the marginal revenue product (MRP) of the team budget. We assume 
diminishing returns in revenue with the winning percentage so that < 1 . A larger market size 
(), ticket price (P), flow of facility amenities (A*), and a larger revenue elasticity with respect to 
the production of facility amenities () shifts the MRP schedule to the right.  
16 
 
 
The owner maximizes profit according to (7) when an additional dollar spent on talent (the team 
budget) that foregoes an investment yielding the market rate of return just equals the increase in 
revenue generated by the additional wins from that talent increase. This yields the optimal 
budget is Bi*. An increase in the real market rate of return to r’ reduces the optimal budget. The 
resulting stock of talent is determined by (1) that then determines an optimal winning percentage 
through an unspecified contest success function. Revenue and profit is then found through (5) 
and (7).12 The tighter the talent market, the smaller the optimal budget since the budget will just 
drive up the market wage Z with little result on team performance and profit. 
 
Complementarity Between Stadium Investment and Talent 
Solving for the optimal team budget from (11) is difficult and not necessary for our purposes. 
The important point is that (11) determines an optimal 𝐵𝑖
∗ that can then be used to determine an 
optimal 𝑡𝑖
∗ and 𝑤𝑖
∗ using (1). These reduced form solutions incorporate the tightness of the talent 
market through the value of 𝜔 which is our (exogenous) characterization of the labor market. 
When a team owner receives a large new facility investment from a local government, his or her 
behavior regarding the team budget for talent is constrained by the tightness of the talent market. 
If 𝜔 is close or equal to one, and/or the team accounts for a significant share of the total league 
budget, then 𝜀𝐵𝑖
𝑍  from (4) is large it could be optimal for the team owner to forego attempting to 
acquire expensive talent so as to avoid simply driving up the market wage W. 
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Differentiating the MRP with respect to 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 provides the complementarity effect (if positive) of 
a new facility investment on the team budget. 
 
𝜕𝑀𝑅𝑃
𝜕𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
=
𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
𝛿𝜃2(1−𝜃)𝛾𝑤𝑖
𝛾−1
𝐾𝑖
(
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
1−𝜔𝜎𝑖
𝑍
) 𝐴𝑖
∗
𝜃
1−𝜃 > 0      (12) 
 
The interesting feature for our purposes is the scalar effect of the tightness of the talent market 
on the extent of complementarity. This is captured by the term (1 − 𝜔𝜎𝑖) 𝑍⁄ . The 
complementarity effect is the largest when 𝜔 = 0, an open talent market, since all of the 
increased budget spending is used to acquire physical talent with no increase in the market wage 
Z. As the talent market tightens, the complementarity effect is reduced. This can lead to the 
perverse case of a completely closed talent market (𝜔 = 1) and a very large budget team (𝜎𝑖 
approaches one). The derivative in (12) approaches zero and the team owner will not be able to 
acquire any new talent, since he or she already owns all of it. The upshot is that any model that 
involves the marginal revenue product requires a characterization of labor market tightness and 
the team’s share of the league budget. This has clear implications for any econometric 
specification.  
 
Other scalar effects in (12) are worth noting. If a team is already a very good team on the field, 
then 𝜕𝑤𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄  will be small, reducing complementarity. Perennial powerhouse teams might have 
little incentive to invest in new talent when a large new facility investment is provided. This 
suggests that an interaction term that includes the past winning percentage and a new facility 
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investment should be part of a regression model. Complementarity is smaller when 𝐾𝑖 is large. 
This can be interpreted to be the new facility investment relative to the stock of capital that 
already exists. Moving from a relatively new stadium to a brand new stadium will have little 
effect on the team owner’s decision to increase the team budget. A regression model could 
include the increase in the market value of significant renovations or when moving from one 
stadium to another, instead of just using a dummy variable for a new stadium. A dummy variable 
reveals nothing about the magnitude of the flow of new facility investment. 
 
The More Complex Environment of Revenue Sharing 
All four major North American professional sports leagues utilize revenue sharing. The revenue 
sharing systems vary markedly, but they all require revenue contributions to a central fund.13 
With revenue sharing (0 < 𝛼 < 1), the optimal team stock of facility labor is given by 
 
𝐿𝑖
∗ = (𝜋𝑖𝐾𝑖)
−1 (
(
((𝑛−1)𝛼+1)
𝑛
)𝛿𝜃𝑤𝑖
𝛾
𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
𝜋𝐾𝑖
𝑊
)
1−𝜃
       (13) 
 
The optimal stock of labour used to produce facility amenities decreases with revenue sharing 
and the number of teams in the league. The optimized flow of facility amenities is given by 
 
𝐴𝑖
∗ = (
(
((𝑛−1)𝛼+1)
𝑛
)𝛿𝜃𝑤𝑖
𝛾
𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
𝜋𝐾𝑖
𝑊
)
1−𝜃
        (14) 
19 
 
 
The production of facility amenities is reduced because the revenue generated must be shared 
with all of the other teams in the league. 
 
Maximizing (7) with respect to the team budget results in the first-order condition below. 
 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝐵𝑖
=
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝐵𝑖
[(
((𝑛−1)𝛼+1)
𝑛
)
𝜕𝑅𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
+ (1 − 𝛼) ∑
𝜕𝑅𝑘
𝜕𝑤𝑘
(
𝜕𝑤𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑖
+
𝜕𝑤𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑖
)𝑛𝑘≠𝑖 ] − (1 + 𝑟) = 0 (15) 
 
The large bracketed term in (15) is the MRP of the team budget and can be divided into the 
direct and indirect effects noted by Fort and Quirk (2007), but in this case it is in the context of 
the team budget. The first term inside the bracket is the direct effect on the revenue of team i 
when it increases its budget by one dollar and is dependent on the talent market openness 
according to the value of the first term 𝜕𝑡𝑖 𝜕𝐵𝑖⁄ : the change in the budget affects the quantity of 
talent, talent changes wins, and wins change revenue. The summation term is the indirect effect 
that is itself the sum of two effects. First, the acquisition of talent by team i will have a negative 
effect on the winning percentage and revenue of team k holding constant the talent stock of team 
k. Added to that is a second potential negative effect if team i can only acquire its talent by 
poaching talent from team k depending on the talent market condition 𝜕𝑡𝑘 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄ . The 𝜕𝑡𝑘 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄ term 
is determined by how constrained the talent market is although its value is not obvious if 0 <
𝜔 < 1.  At 𝜔 = 0 then, 𝜕𝑡𝑘 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄ = 0, and when 𝜔 = 0, 𝜕𝑡𝑘 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄ = −1. 
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Substituting the necessary derivatives into (15) gives the MRP of the budget as a function of the 
underlying market for talent. 
 
𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑖 =
1−𝜎𝑖𝜔
𝑍
[(
((𝑛−1)𝛼+1)
𝑛
)
𝛾𝑅𝑖
𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
− (1 − 𝛼) ∑
𝛾𝑅𝑘
𝑤𝑘
(|
𝜕𝑤𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑖
| +
𝜕𝑤𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑘
|
𝜕𝑡𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑖
|)𝑛𝑘≠𝑖 ]  (16) 
 
Complementarity Between Stadium Investment and Talent 
With revenue sharing the equivalent first order condition in (12) is given by 
 
𝜕𝑀𝑅𝑃
𝜕𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
= (
((𝑛−1)𝛼+1)
𝑛
)
𝑃𝑖
1−𝜌
𝛿𝜃2(1−𝜃)𝛾𝑤𝑖
𝛾−1
𝐾𝑖
(
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
1−𝜔𝜎𝑖
𝑍
) 𝐴𝑖
∗
𝜃
1−𝜃 > 0    (17) 
 
The effects of revenue sharing and labour market tightness on the extent of complementarity can 
be deduced from (17). More extensive revenue sharing reduces  thereby reducing  and the 
return to the team budget from a higher Ai. The increased revenues from investing in more talent 
and improving the team must be shared to a greater extent with the rest of the league, reducing 
the incentive to acquire talent and to improve the teams winning percentage. If the team is 
required to contribute a significant proportion of the new facility financing, insofar as it is 
sharing with the rest of the league, it may decide not to invest (although self-finance is not a 
feature of our model in (7)) and continue to operate in an aging facility with a losing team.  
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Talent market tightness is reflected in a value for  that is closer to one and reduces the 
complementarity between the facility amenities and the team budget in (17). The magnitude of 
the disincentive effect depends upon the share of the team budget in the total league budget given 
by i. High budget teams that face a tighter labour market will experience smaller positive 
complementarity. This is due to the increase in the market wage Z that results from an increase in 
the team talent stock. For large spenders, Z will increase quickly in (17). Complementarity 
cannot exist when 𝜀𝐵𝑖
𝑍 = 𝜎𝑖𝜔 = 1, however we can safely exclude that possibility by recognizing 
that the largest share of any single team in the league budget over the 1991 – 2013 period in 
MLB was the New York Yankees in 2005 at 9.9%. Setting 𝜔 = 1, the largest possible value for 
𝜀𝐵𝑖
𝑍  was 0.099 for any of the 30 teams in MLB, not close at all to eliminating complementarity in 
(17), given that Z > 0. 
 
The scant empirical literature, represented by Clapp and Hakes (2005) and Quinn et al (2003), 
finds only weak to zero complementarity between new facilities and attendance, or new facility 
investments and team performance. Weak or zero complementarity is possible in (17) in the 
simplest case if revenue does not respond to amenities,  = 0. However even if  > 0 when  = 0 
(attendance is completely unresponsive to an increase in the team winning percentage) or 
𝜕𝑤𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄  = 0 (a team with a very large stock of talent), complementarity is zero. A team with a 
large budget operating in a tight labour market could make 𝜀𝐵𝑖
𝑍 = 𝜎𝑖𝜔 close to one and reduce 
complementarity to insignificance. Finally, a high market wage per unit of talent, Z, reduces 
complementarity.  
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Empirical Evidence 
The question is simple: does the provision of a new facility encourage team owners to invest in 
talent and improve the performance of the team? The answer is complex. As we have shown in 
the model, the ultimate effect on producing a winning team is dependent upon tightness in the 
talent market, the economic size of the local market, how much is already being spent on payroll, 
the fans response to winning and the extent of revenue sharing. Since a higher winning 
percentage is the variable in question, it makes sense to solve for it in the model so that an 
econometric specification is suggested. This can be accomplished by solving for the optimal 
MRP in (11) (or (16) with revenue sharing), then solving for the optimal stock of talent (𝑡𝑖
∗) and 
finally substituting into a contest success function to arrive at an optimal winning percentage 
(𝑤𝑖
∗). This would, of course, include all of the exogenous parameters in the model in a highly 
non-linear form. Even with the most basic functional forms, this task has proven difficult. 
 
We have chosen to use a much simpler empirical model that captures the important features. Our 
sample period will include all MLB teams from 1991 to 2013. We exclude NFL, NBA and NHL 
teams from consideration. The NFL and NBA used some form of salary cap during the entire 
sample period, while the NHL adopted a salary cap in the 2005-06 season. The presence of a 
salary cap makes it very difficult to measure the extent of talent market tightness if many teams 
are at or near the salary cap. 
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In our approach, a team owner can respond to a new facility that promises greater amenities by 
investing in team talent. We use the team payroll (in 1991 dollars) to measure the owner’s effort 
to do this. His or her efforts might have the effect of driving up the wage rate per unit of talent in 
the league, with little effect on the team stock of talent. We include the median salary (in 1991 
dollars) to attempt to control for this type of talent market tightness. Payroll might also increase 
if the league receives higher national television revenue so we include this (in 1991 dollars). The 
revenue garnered from local television contracts has been much higher than the national revenue 
recently, but unfortunately accurate data on local television revenue is not available from a 
convenient source.14 
 
Revenue sharing was utilized in different forms in MLB throughout the sample period. Over the 
1991 through 1997 seasons, a gate sharing system was used that required American League 
teams to give 20% of their ticket revenue to the visiting club. National League visiting teams 
received 50 cents per ticket sold which worked out to approximately 5% of the ticket revenue 
using average ticket prices in the league. A transition period to more extensive revenue sharing 
began in the 1998 season that culminated with a central pool revenue sharing system for the 2003 
season. Each MLB club contributed one-third of their local revenue to a central fund to be 
divided evenly among all MLB clubs. We construct a dummy variable that takes on the value 
one for the 2003-13 seasons to account for the potential negative effect of more extensive 
revenue sharing on MLB payrolls, as predicted by theory. 
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A simple way to capture a new facility is to use a dummy variable, however our model suggests 
that the ability to produce valued amenities is greater the more that is invested in facility capital. 
We construct a measure of the real value of the facility capital by inflating (or deflating) the 
construction costs of every stadium in MLB to 1991 dollars (construction costs obtained from 
http://www.ballparks.com) using a construction cost index 
(http://enr.construction.com/economics/historical_indices/). In most cases, a new stadium (or a 
major renovation of an existing stadium) generated a large increase in the real value of the 
facility capital. We also include team fixed effects to account for differences in local market 
sizes on payrolls. 
 
Our payroll regression specification is: 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑇𝑉𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐷2003𝑡 (18) 
 
where  𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 = real team payroll (1991 = 100) 
 𝐾𝑖𝑡 = real value of the facility capital (1991 = 100) 
 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 = real median league salary (1991 = 100) 
 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑇𝑉𝑡 = real national television revenue per team (1991 = 100) 
 𝐷2003𝑡 = dummy variable (D2003 = 1 for 2003-13 seasons) 
 
In our theoretical model, the team winning percentage is determined by an unspecified contest 
success function that includes the team stock of talent and the total stock of talent in the rest of 
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the league. We have no measure of a stock of talent and use the team payroll in 1991 dollars as a 
proxy and the total payroll in 1991 dollars for the other MLB teams (rol_payroll).  
 
A higher payroll could translate to a higher winning percentage. We can use the function in (1) 
and the definition of the wage rate (𝑍 = 𝐵 𝑇⁄ ) to derive an expression for the winning 
percentage, 𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑡⁄ = (𝐵𝑖𝑡 𝐵
𝜔⁄ ) (𝐵 𝑍⁄ )⁄ . Taking logs of both sides results in our winning 
percentage regression specification. 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖𝑡) = 𝜑1𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡) + 𝜑2𝑙𝑛(𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡) + 𝜑3𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡) (19) 
 
where   𝑤𝑖𝑡 = team winning percentage 
 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 = real team payroll (1991 = 100) 
 𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑡 = real total payroll for rest of league (1991 = 100) 
 𝑚𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 = real median league salary (1991 = 100) 
 
The median wage is a proxy for the wage rate per unit of talent (Z). The regression coefficients 
in (18) and (19) were estimated using cross-section fixed effects and White’s heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariance matrix estimator in each case. The estimates of the payroll function in (18) 
and the winning percentage function in (19) are given in Table 1. 
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A 100% increase in the capital value of the facility (not unreasonable given the construction 
costs of new facilities) increases the payroll by just 7.7% holding the median wage constant. This 
is quite inelastic, suggesting that the shift in the MRP from a new facility is small. A 10% 
increase in the median wage increases the club payroll by 9.85%, suggesting that clubs do not 
react by releasing talent.15 Neither national TV revenue nor the change to the pooled revenue 
sharing system in 2003 had a significant effect on club payrolls. 
 
All three independent variables in the estimate of equation (18) were statistically significant at a 
high level of confidence. Summary statistics are not reported in Table 1 since the winning 
percentage function was estimated without an intercept resulting in a negative R-squared. It is 
easy to show that 𝜔 = 1 − 𝜑2 so that we have an estimate of the tightness in the talent market 
equal to 0.234 and the point elasticity estimate of the talent supply function of 3.3 – highly 
elastic over the twenty-four year sample period. Recall that 𝜔 = 0 is the open talent market case 
in our model, so we can say that the talent market in MLB is reasonably open. Acquiring more 
talent bids up the market wage rate per unit of talent somewhat.  
 
Using the coefficients from Table 1, we can estimate the effect of a one dollar increase in 
stadium investment on the club winning percentage for an average club in MLB. This is given by 
the derivative 
 
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑖𝑡
=
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝐵𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝐵𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑖𝑡
= ?̂?1(?̂?1 + ?̂?2𝜎?̅?)
𝑤𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝐾𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅
        (20) 
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By definition, the average winning percentage is 0.5 (or 500 in the units used in the estimation of 
(19)) and the average share of total league payroll is 1/30. The average capital value is $204 
million (1991 dollars) in the sample. Inserting the coefficients estimates, using these average 
values and multiplying by the average increase in asset value with a new facility over the sample 
of $102.5 million (1991 dollars), results in an estimated increase in club winning percentage of 
just 3.38 percentage points. While statistically significant, this result is not economically 
significant. 
 
We do not have a sufficient number of observations to estimate (18) and (19) for each team, 
however we can estimate the specific team effect by using the league average coefficient 
estimates in Table 1 and the average team values for 𝜎𝑖, 𝑤𝑖 and 𝐾𝑖. These estimates appear in 
Table 2. Teams with higher average winning percentages experience a larger stadium effect, 
ceteris paribus, due to the upward shift in the MRP of the investment, while teams with higher 
capital values experience a smaller stadium effect due to a lower MRP. Teams whose payroll 
accounts for a larger share of total league payroll experience a larger stadium effect due to the 
greater effect on the market wage of bidding for more talent. 
 
Conclusions 
We construct a model of a profit-maximizing sports team owner who chooses an optimal talent 
budget and stadium labor. This permits us to measure the degree of complementarity between the 
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budget and improved facility amenities that are typical of a new stadium or a stadium that 
undergoes a major renovation. The novelty of our approach is the incorporation of the state of 
the talent market. We show that estimating the effect of stadium amenities on team performance 
requires modelling the supply of talent.  If it is scarce as in the case of a closed talent market, the 
owner will simply drive up the market wage with no improvement in the team winning 
percentage, and a smaller increase in attendance than would have been the case had the team 
been improved. Further, our approach allows us to estimate the elasticity of talent supply which 
has a long run value of 3.3. In our model, a new stadium shifts fan demand for tickets by only 7.7 
percent in the first year, resulting in more slightly more revenue for the owner which can be 
spent on acquiring talent even though the winning percentage rose only by 3.8 percentage points.  
The model permits complementarity between the stadium investment and talent although without 
an explicit measure of talent, we are unable to calculate a numerical estimate of the elasticity. 
Our model also suggests additional variables and interactions that should enhance empirical 
investigation of the relationship between facilities’ improvements and team performance. 
 
 
Notes
11 http://www.ballparks.com/ 
2 Deflated using a construction cost index obtained from http://enr.construction.com/economics/historical_indices/ 
3 Psychic benefits may accrue all over the world from a particular stadium, and in principle the beneficiaries should 
be taxed.  We restrict our discussion to local benefits since this is where the lion’s share of the costs accrue. 
4 There may be other reasons for building a stadium.  Increased local employment, increased local income, drawing 
contingent funding from other public or even private sources, revitalization of urban areas are only some of the 
rationales. 
5 We do not specify a specific form for this contest success function as doing so would unnecessarily complicate the 
development of the model. We could find no generally agreed upon function for the case of n > 2. 
6 Madden (2011) also develops a model of a professional sports league in which team owners invest in talent by 
choosing a budget. Our approach is a somewhat simplified version of his model. 
7 Working with a team budget, rather than a stock of talent, allows for both a Cournot-Nash conjecture regarding 
budgets and a different derivative regarding talent stocks, 𝜕𝑡𝑘 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄ , that could be equal to zero in an open talent 
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market or something else in a restricted talent market. Easton and Rockerbie (2005) considered the best responses of 
teams to changes in each other’s stock of talent in the face of pooled revenue sharing. The extension to team budgets 
is straightforward and will not change the results found there either. This follows Winfree and Fort (2012) and 
Madden (2011) who recommend this approach to make the sports league model logically consistent. In the 
traditional sports league model, 𝜕𝑡𝑘 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄  served the dual purpose of a behavioral conjecture and a talent supply 
constraint, something it cannot do. The upshot is that in the Winfree and Fort (2012) approach, 𝜕𝑡𝑘 𝜕𝑡𝑖⁄  is not a 
behavioral conjecture at all, rather it is just a physical constraint imposed by the talent market supply assumption. 
However in a static one-shot game (Lindh (1992)), 𝜕𝐵𝑘 𝜕𝐵𝑖⁄ = 0 is a consistent budget conjecture. The Winfree and 
Fort (2012) and Madden (2011) approaches allow for this. 
8 The elasticity of league talent is linked to budgets as: (𝐵 𝑇⁄ )(𝑑𝑇 𝑑𝐵⁄ ) = (1 − 𝜔). 
9 Vrooman (2015) utilizes an elasticity of talent supply by specifying an ad hoc talent supply function that is not 
linked to budgets. His approach focuses on parity issues that we do not address in this paper. 
10 Some examples are the MLB Miami Marlins, Pittsburgh Pirates, Cincinnati Reds, Milwaukee Brewers, New York 
Mets and Houston Astros, among others. All of these clubs had losing records for at least five years prior to agreeing 
on a new stadium deal.  
11 The NBA and NHL also use revenue sharing systems, however they are too complex to model easily.  
12 It is important to note that requiring the team owner to pay for a portion of the new facility investment will not 
affect the results we derive concerning complementarity of the team budget (that is spent on acquiring talent) and 
the facility investment for two reasons. First, if the team budget is set independently of the owner share of the 
facility investment, and in no way constrains the team budget, we can treat the owner share as a fixed cost in the 
algebra. Second, even if the owner share comes out of the team budget, it would simply increase the marginal cost of 
the budget in Figure 1 and reduce the optimal team budget spent on talent. This would be equivalent to an increase 
in r. 
13 The most extensive revenue sharing agreements are MLB and the NFL where each team contributes roughly one-
third of its local revenue to a central fund that is then divided evenly among all teams. NBA teams each contribute 
50% of their local revenue, less allowable expenses, to a central fund and receive back an amount equal to the 
average team payroll. The top ten revenue teams in the NHL contribute decreasing amounts based on their revenue 
rank. Playoff teams ten contribute 35% of their home gate revenue so that the total revenue raised is equal to 
approximately 6% of total anticipated hockey related revenues for the league. Monies are then redistributed 
disproportionately to the lowest payroll clubs. 
14 National TV revenue has caught up to local TV revenue very recently. National TV revenue for the 2014-15 
season amounted to approximately $50 million per team in MLB. Prior to this season, the amount was 
approximately $13.3 million per team. Local TV revenue varied considerably for the 2013-14 season. The Los 
Angeles Dodgers are estimated to have received $123 million while the Cincinnati Reds received only $20 million. 
Most teams earned less than $40 million. All TV revenue data were taken from Rod Fort’s sports business data 
website on 22/06/2015 (https://umich.app.box.com/s/41707f0b2619c0107b8b/1/32002264). 
15 We also estimated (18) with a smaller sample that excluded new expansion clubs and clubs that did not move into 
new facilities or have major renovations during the sample period. The capital value effect on the club payroll was 
estimated to be 8.8% and the effect of the median wage was 9.11%, both statistically significant at 95% confidence. 
These values did not differ enough from the full sample to change any of the results that follow. 
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Table 1. Estimates of equations (18) and (19), 1991-2013, full sample. 
Coefficient Estimate T statistic Estimate T statistic 
𝛽0 1.683 1.927**   
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𝛽1 0.077 2.545*   
𝛽2 0.985 15.477*   
𝛽3 0.010 0.299   
𝛽4 0.048 1.603   
𝜑1   0.149 9.696* 
𝜑2   0.766 9.507* 
𝜑3   -0.867 -7.451* 
Adjusted R2 0.704    
Std. Error 0.288    
F 47.885*    
N 670  672  
 
** indicates statistical significance at 90% confidence. * indicates statistical significance at 95% confidence. 
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Table 2. Team-specific stadium effects on winning percentage 
 ?̅?𝑖 ?̅?𝑖 𝐾𝑖
1 𝑑𝐾𝑖
 𝑑𝑤𝑖  
Atlanta 0.116 581 195 110 6.00 
Cincinnati 0.087 500 158 95 4.98 
Miami 0.062 469 325 199 4.34 
Milwaukee 0.077 475 305 265 6.61 
New York (NL) 0.129 490 337 205 5.70 
Philadelphia 0.118 507 235 82 3.26 
Pittsburgh 0.057 454 200 0 0.00 
San Diego 0.071 481 354 244 5.18 
San Francisco 0.110 521 277 189 6.38 
St. Louis 0.108 535 248 153 5.90 
Baltimore 0.100 474 97 47 3.98 
Cleveland 0.087 513 156 33 1.80 
Detroit 0.106 469 233 138 4.92 
Houston 0.089 495 188 -46 -2.03 
Kansas City 0.069 444 314 135 2.96 
Los Angeles (AL) 0.118 515 208 94 4.29 
Minnesota 0.076 490 295 265 7.02 
New York (AL) 0.205 580 742 587 10.80 
Oakland 0.105 519 177 70 3.63 
Seattle 0.106 491 330 204 5.37 
Texas 0.105 510 171 119 6.27 
 
1Stadium construction cost of new facility or renovations in 1991 dollars (using construction cost index) excluding 
land value. 
